Federalist paper 51

Not only many of the officers of government, who obeyed the dictates of personal interest, but others, from a mistaken estimate of consequences, or the undue influence of former attachments, or whose ambition aimed at objects which did not correspond with the public good, were indefatigable in their efforts to pursuade the people to reject the advice of that patriotic Congress.These are some of the disadvantages which would flow from the principle of exclusion.It is one of those cases which must be left to provide for itself.It certainly must be immaterial what mode is observed as to the order of declaring the rights of the citizens, if they are to be found in any part of the instrument which establishes the government.

By way of answer to this, it has been triumphantly asked, Why not in the first instance omit that ambiguous power, and rely upon the latter resource.A successful faction may erect a tyranny on the ruins of order and law, while no succor could constitutionally be afforded by the Union to the friends and supporters of the government.The answer indeed seems to be so obvious and conclusive as scarcely to justify such a discussion in any place.It has a court of admiralty, but none of probates, at least on the plan of ours.

And it will be clearly shown in the course of this investigation that as far as the principle contended for has prevailed, it has been the cause of incurable disorder and imbecility in the government.

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A navy of the United States, as it would embrace the resources of all, is an object far less remote than a navy of any single State or partial confederacy, which would only embrace the resources of a single part.I have appealed to our own experience for the truth of what I advance on this subject.Where then are we to seek for those additional articles of expense which are to swell the account to the enormous size that has been represented to us.If, therefore, the loud clamors against the plan of the convention, on this score, are well founded, no epithets of reprobation will be too strong for the constitution of this State.Whilst all authority in it will be derived from and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority.This information, so far as it may relate to local objects, is rendered necessary and difficult, not by a difference of laws and local circumstances within a single State, but of those among different States.

The power of influencing a person, in the sense in which it is here used, must imply a power of conferring a benefit upon him.It would therefore be destitute of a precise meaning, and inoperative from its uncertainty.The inference will be, that a conduct tending to give an undue preference to either is much less to be dreaded from the former than from the latter.The more I revolve the subject, the more fully I am persuaded that the balance is much more likely to be disturbed by the preponderancy of the last than of the first scale.A recurrence to the principles there established will satisfy us, that there is no color to pretend that the State governments would, by the adoption of that plan, be divested of the privilege of paying their own debts in their own way, free from every constraint but that which flows from the obligations of good faith.In all important cases, not only the provinces but the cities must be unanimous.There are others which have a more circumscribed though an equally operative influence within their spheres.

Thus without corrupting the body of the people, the immediate agents in the election will at least enter upon the task free from any sinister bias.Destitute of this essential support, it must resign its independence, and sink into the degraded condition of a province.That of New Hampshire is to be marched to Georgia, of Georgia to New Hampshire, of New York to Kentucky, and of Kentucky to Lake Champlain.He was one of the three authors that wrote the federalist papers.

As far, therefore, as their superior wealth and weight may justly entitle them to any advantage, it ought to be secured to them by a superior share of representation.He would naturally say to himself, it is impossible that all this vehement and pathetic declamation can be without some colorable pretext.If such suppositions could even be reasonably made, still the concealment of the design, for any duration, would be impracticable.

Past transactions of the government will be a ready and accurate source of information to new members.It was by them shown, as well on the credit of historical examples, as from the reason of the thing, that the most POPULAR branch of every government, partaking of the republican genius, by being generally the favorite of the people, will be as generally a full match, if not an overmatch, for every other member of the Government.Is the aggregate power of the general government greater than ought to have been vested in it.Truth, no less than decency, requires that the event in every case should be supposed to depend on the sentiments and sanction of their common constituents.It must be seen at once that the proposed uniformity in the VALUE of the current coin might be destroyed by subjecting that of foreign coin to the different regulations of the different States.A sixtieth part of the Union, which is about the proportion of Delaware and Rhode Island, has several times been able to oppose an entire bar to its operations.They will be more temperate and cool, and in that respect, as well as in others, will be more in capacity to act advisedly than the offending State.The Roman history records many instances of mischiefs to the republic from the dissensions between the Consuls, and between the military Tribunes, who were at times substituted for the Consuls.

Neither the pride nor the safety of the more important States or confederacies would permit them long to submit to this mortifying and adventitious superiority.If a return can be obtained, no matter by what unlawful means, the irregular member, who takes his seat of course, is sure of holding it a sufficient time to answer his purposes.It is not generally to be expected, that men will vary and measures remain uniform.The tenure by which the judges are to hold their places, is, as it unquestionably ought to be, that of good behavior.

As to those just causes of war which proceed from direct and unlawful violence, it appears equally clear to me that one good national government affords vastly more security against dangers of that sort than can be derived from any other quarter.In a single state, if the persons intrusted with supreme power become usurpers, the different parcels, subdivisions, or districts of which it consists, having no distinct government in each, can take no regular measures for defense.From a close examination it will appear that restraints upon the discretion of the legislature in respect to military establishments in time of peace, would be improper to be imposed, and if imposed, from the necessities of society, would be unlikely to be observed.